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GIBBONS V. OGDEN THEN AND NOW
By HUGH EvANDER Wmms*
1. STATEMENT op TnE CASE
Gibbons v. Ogden' is one of the great landmarks in United
States Constitutional history. In this case Chief Justice Marshall
wrote one of his five greatest opinions, and in his appearance
before the Supreme Court in this case, Webster made his greatest
argument. Gibbons v. Ogden and M'Cidloch v. Maryland wrote
into our Constitution the doctrine of a dual form of government,
and the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden made the Constitution
legally accomplish what was the moving cause of the adoption
of the Constitution in the Constitutional Convention-'to keep
the commercial intercourse among the states free from all in-
vidious and impartial restraints."
Chancellor Livingston of New York for a number of years
had been trying to solve the problem of steam navigation and
had been conducting experiments on the Hudson River. In
1798, he procured from the New York Legislature an act giving
him for twenty years the exclusive right to navigate by steam-
boats the streams and waters of the state, provided he should
build a boat within a year which would make four miles an
hour against the current of the Hudson. Another American,
Robert Fulton, had been trying experiments of the same sort
on the River Seine and in 1803 gave a public exhibition for
Napoleon before scientists of France. The scientists of France
were not impressed, but Livingston, who was present, was
impressed. They soon met and formed a partnership. Livings-
ton failed to meet the conditions of the Steamboat Act given
him, but his agent, Nicholas J. Roosevelt, succeeded in having
it renewed. Livingston resigned his position as American min-
ister to France and returned home. Within a year he was
* Prof. of Law, Law School, Indiana University, Bloomington,
Indiana, B.A. 1897, M.A. 1899, LL.B. 1901, LL.M. 1902, Univ. of Minn.;
LL.D. 1925, Yankton Coll.; Univ. of Minn. Law School, 1902-13 (Asst.
Prof. of Law 1906, Prof. of Law, 1910); Dean and Prof. of Law, South-
western University Law School, 1913-15; Prof. of Law, University of
North Dakota 1917-22; Dean 1920-22; Prof. of Law, Indiana University,
since 1922. Author of numerous books and magazine articles.
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joined by Fulton. Livingston failed to meet the conditions
of the second act of the New York Legislature and a third was
passed. The conditions of this act were met on August 17,
1807, by a successful steamboat voyage up the Hudson from
New York to Albany. In April, 1808, a final act was voted by
the New York Legislature giving Livingston and Fulton five
years' prolongation of their monopoly for a full period of not
exceeding thirty years, and forbiding the navigation of New
York waters by steam craft without a license from Livingston
and Fulton. Soon three boats were operating between New
York and Albany, and Livingston and Fulton obtained from
the legislature of Orleans territory the same exclusive privilege
for steam navigation upon Louisiana waters, including the
mouth of the Mississippi, that New York had granted upon the
waters of that state. The people in other states resented the
privileges thus given Livingston and Fulton and the legislatures
of other states began to retaliate. The New Jersey legislature
authorized the owner of any boat seized under the New York
law to seize any steam propelled craft belonging to a citizen of
New York to be forfeited for the New Jersey boat seized.
Connecticut forbade any vessel licensed by Livingston and
Fulton from entering Connecticut waters. Even other citizens
of New York defied the Livingston and Fulton monopoly. One
James Van Ingan and his associates thus challenged their
exclusive contract. Livingston and Fulton sued them for an
injunction against their operating their boats. Chancellor
Lansing denied the injunction on the ground that the monopoly
was a denial of the natural rights of all citizens to the free
navigation of the waters of the state. This opinion was reversed
by the Court of Errors and in his opinion Chief Justice Kent
discussed the question of state power as against the power of
the national government to grant such a monopoly, and he upheld
the state power on the theory that the power given to congress
was not exclusive and that the states had a concurrent power
until their action came into collision with the federal power,
and even then that the national power was only incidental.
Then the case of Gibbons v. Ogden came into the picturs
Ogden had purchased from Livingston and Fulton the privilege
of running ferry boats from New York to points in New Jersey
and he combined with Gibbons, who operated a boat at New
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Jersey landings, but who had not secured permission to
navigate the New York waters. The steam boat monopoly
asked for an injunction against them. Kent refused to enjoin
Ogden because he operated his boat under the license of the
monopoly but did enjoin Gibbons from operating boats in the
waters of New York or the Hudson. Gibbons was angered by
this decree and began to run boats between New York and
New Jersey in competition with Ogden, his former associate.
Ogden applied to Chancellor Kent for an injunction. Gibbons
set up as a defense a license from the national government
to run his boats in the coasting trade. Kent held that the
act of Congress licensing a vessel for the coasting trade con-
ferred no right incompatible with the exclusive right of Livings-
ton and Fulton. The Court of Errors followed Chancellor
Kent's opinion and the case was then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.2
Gibbons was represented by Webster and Wirt, and Ogden
was represented by Emmett and Oakley. Pinckney would
have appeared for Ogden but he was fatally ill and died during
this term of court.
The importance of this case cannot be over emphasized. In
spite of the adoption of the Constitution various states, because
of the invention of the steamboat, were doing the very things
for the suppression of which the Constitution had been adopted.
If some way could not have been discovered to stop these
conflicts, the Constitution might as well have never been
adopted. Marshall discovered the way, and in his opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden made the power to regulate commerce given
to Congress by the original Constitution adequate for the purpose
and set forth the principles of our dual form of government
so as to settle and make understandable for all time the relation
between the states on the one hand and the federal government
on the other, perhaps, if it had been realized, even to the
settlement of the slavery question.
The questions involved in the case were: What is com-
merce? When is commerce interstate? What is the power
of the federal government over interstate and intrastate com-
2For a more complete discussion of the background of this
decision see Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, Vol. 4, p. 397-460,
and Warren, The ,Supreme Court in the United States History, Vol. 2,
pp. 47-92.
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merce ? Marshall answered each of these questions and thereby
laid the foundation for our constitutional law upon these sub-
jects; and the fundamental principles laid down by him still
remain the fundamental principles upon the subject although
some of his positions have been modified by later decisions, some
of the points decided by him have had later clarification, and
for short periods his principles have been wholly repudiated.
ie defined commerce as commercial intercourse including
both traffic and transportation. With him it was obvious that
commerce included traffic (buying and selling), and the only
difficulty was whether it included transportation. He held
that it did and that transportation included navigation. H=e
based his argument upon the common understanding of the
people and the primary object of the adoption of the Con-
stitution.
As to when commerce is interstate, Marshall did not give
the final word, but he did establish the general doctrine.
Interstate commerce, according to him, is that commerce which
concerns more states than one. It includes all of the external
concerns of the nation and those internal concerns which
effect the states generally. This power of Congress must be
exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several states.
It cannot stop at the state boundaries. But just when interstate
commerce begins in one state and ends in another state and
whether it includes production and a flow of goods, the decision
in Gibbons v. Ogden did not clear up.
On the nature and scope of the power Marshall also was
somewhat uncertain. As to whether the power of the federal
government over interstate commerce is exclusive or concurrent,
Webster had argued that the power was an exclusive power,
and there is some language in the decision of Gibbons v. Ogden
which suggests that this was the opinion of Chief Justice Mar-
shall. He, for example, compared the police power with the
power of taxation, and pointed out that the states and the
federal government each exercises a separate power of taxation,
but that when the states proceed to regulate interstate or
foreign commerce, they are exercising the very power granted
to Congress; and he also pointed out how there are restrictions
on the taxing power, but none on the commerce power. Yet,
he finally took the position that the New York laws were void
K NTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
because they came into collision with an act of Congress to
which they must yield under the doctrine of supersedure and
that it was "immaterial whether the New York laws were
passed under the concurrent power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states or in virtue of a
power to regulate their domestic trade and police."
As to whether the federal government under the com-
merce clause may have power to regulate intrastate commerce,
the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden was silent. It left unsettled the
question of the scope of the power of the Federal government
to prevent obstructions to interstate commerce and to foster
interstate commerce. It recognized in the states a general police
power which might conflict with the power of the federal gov-
ernment to regulate interstate commerce. But it took the position
that the power to regulate is the power to govern and is a com-
plete power which may be exercised to its utmost extent and
which acknowledges no limitations, thereby impliedly, if not
expressly, holding that the power over interstate commerce is
no less than that over foreign commerce; that the power to
regulate includes the power to prohibit; that the power may
be used for the general welfare as well as for the benefit of
commerce; and that the power is not limited by the powers
over intrastate commerce retained by the states, but instead
the powers of the states over intrastate commerce are limited
by the power of Congress over interstate commerce, under
the doctrine of federal supremacy, whenever there is a con-
fict between the two powers; and that no subject is withdrawn
from the delegated powers of the United States by the fact that
the same subject matter lies within the reserved powers of the
states, or by the fact that the exercise of its power by the
federal government may interfere with the powers of the
states.
2. SUBSEQUENT HIISTORY OF THE CASE
a. Comtmerce
Chief Justice Marshall defined commerce as commercial
intercourse in all of its branches including both traffic and
transportation (and navigation). The decision that commerce
includes transportation has never since been doubted. It is
true that for a time the Supreme Court held that only goods
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and not persons could be the subject of commerce,3 but tbis
position was soon abandoned and the court held that com-
merce included the transportation of persons as well as goods. 4
With this exception the Supreme Court has not hesitated to
hold that wherever there was transportation there was com-
merce. Thus it held commerce the transportation of informa-
tion,6 the transportation of electrical current,6 the transportation
of gas,7 the transportation of prize fight films,s and the trans-
portation of many other things though no profit motive is
involved.
However, upon the subject of whether commerce includes
traffic, that is, buying and selling, the later decisions of the
United States Supreme Court have not been so consistent.
There was after awhile a tendency to limit commerce to trans-
portation. The court had no difficulty in holding that there
was commerce where people passed back and forth over a
bridge,10 and even where sheep were being driven from one
state to another,". but where there was a sale either of tangi-
bles' 2 or of intangibles 13 without the contemplation of any
transportation, the court apparently began to hold that there
was no commerce. Certainly it held that neither the making of
insurance 14 nor advertising's was commerce, and even went
so far as to hold that the federal government could not pro-
hibit the transportation in interstate commerce of goods manu-
factured by child labor,' 6 or apply the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act to manufacture,' 7 because it was undertaking to regulate
something which was not commerce. These decisions represented
3 Mayor, etc., of City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102 (U. S. 1837).
4 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885).
"Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877).
6 Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam
and Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927).
7 State Tax Commission of Mississippi v. Interstate Natural Gas
Co., Inc., 284 U. S. 41 (1931).
IWeber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325 (1915).
'United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (1919); Wilson v. United
States, 232 U. S. 563 (1914).
' Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 (1894).
u Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1 (1903).12Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921).
IsInternational Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 (1910).
'Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868).25Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252
U. S. 436 (1920).
"Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
2United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
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the viewpoint of such justices as Field, White, Day, Sutherland,
Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter. More recently the
Supreme Court has gone back to the definition of Marshall
and has made commerce include traffic as well as transporta-
tion.1s  It even has modified the advertising case.19  It has
not, as yet, expressly overruled the insurance case and the
child labor case, but it must be assumed that these cases have
been overruled sub silentio by the recent cases just cited and
other cases in accord with them.20 These recent cases represent
the viewpoint of such justices as Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and
Cardozo. These latest holdings represent a return to the
viewpoint of Chief Justice Marshall and not only vindicate the
position of the great Chief Justice, but represent the triumph
of sane thinking and probably have reestablished Marshall's
definition so it will never again be questioned.
b. When Commerce becomes Interstate
Chief Justice Marshall explained the meaning of interstate
commerce, pointed out where it began and ended, and drew the
line between intrastate and interstate commerce in broad general
outlines, but he did not fill in many specific details. Later cases
have undertaken to fill in these details. Some of these later
cases have carried out the spirit of Marshall's generalizations
and some of them undoubtedly have run counter to such spirit.
First, of the cases which determined when interstate com-
merce begins. The case of United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,21
held in an opinion by Chief Justice Fuller that interstate com-
merce did not extend to the regulation of manufacture by the
United States. Following this case there came in 1905 the case
of Swift & Co. v. United States2 2 which in an opinion by Justice
Holmes announced the doctrine of a flow or current of commerce
so that interstate commerce would extend back for regulation by
the United States to what otherwise would have been called in-
' Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936); National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 300 U. S. 1 (1937);
Associated Press v. National Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103 (1937).
lIndiana Farmers Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co.,
293 U. S. 268 (1934).
21 Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936); Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 299 U. S. 334 (1936).
21156 U.S. 1 (1895).
2196 U. St 375 (1905).
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trastate commerce. This case was followed by Stafford v. Wal-
lace23 in 1922 and Board of Trade v. Olsen24 in 1923, the opinions
in which were written by Chief Justice Taft (MelReynolds and
Sutherland dissenting). In 1918 came the first child labor
decision of Hammer v. Dagenhart25 in which the Supreme Court
in an opinion by Justice Day to which Holmes, Brandeis,
McKenna, and Clarke dissented took as narrow a position as it
had taken in United States v. B. C. Knight Co., but. shortly
after this case there followed a number of decisions taking a
liberal view as to the beginning of interstate commerce. Dahnke-
Walker v. Boizedurant26 in 1921 held that there was interstate
commerce so as to prevent state regulation when a person from
one state bought some goods in another state although he
later decided never to ship them to the first state. Lemke v.
Farizers' Grain Co.,27 decided in 1922, held that interstate com-
merce had begun after grain had been deposited in grain
elevators in North Dakota even though there was yet no sale
of it to other states, because statistics showed that year after
year a greater part of such grain was shipped to other states,
and the Court denied the power of the state to regulate it by
a grain grading act. In Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of
Portland,2 s decided in 1925, the Supreme Court held in an
opinion by Justice McReynolds that interstate commerce began
with the soliciting of orders by drummers. Yet, in passing
upon some of the pieces of so-called New Deal Federal Legisla-
tion the Supreme Court in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad,2 9 decided in 1935, a case involving a compulsory rail-
road retirement and pension act; in Schecter v. United States.,30
decided in 1935, a case involving the National Recovery Act;
in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,3 1 decided in 1936, a case involving
the Guffey-Snyder Bituminous Coal Act; and in United States v.
Butler,32 decided in 1936, a case involving the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act, in opinions by Justices Sutherland and Roberts
258 U. S. 495 (1922).
262 U. S. 1 (1923).
247 U. S. 251 (1918).
257 U. S. 282 (1921).
'258 U. S. 50 (1922).
268 U. S. 325 (1925).
295 U. S. 330 (1935).
"295 U. S. 495 (1935).
298 U. S. 238 (1936).
2297 U. S. 1 (1936).
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and Chief Justice Hughes, took a conservative view as to the
beginning of interstate commerce, and denied power to the
federal government. However, after the shift in position of
Justice Roberts from the conservative to the liberal side of the
Supreme Court, the Court took a liberal view as to the beginning
of interstate commerce in the eases of National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.,83 involving the National
Labor Relations Act, and Mulford v. Smith,34 involving the new
Agricultural Adjustment Act, in opinions by Chief Justice
Hughes and Justice Roberts.
It should be observed that most of the decisions prior to
1937 taking a liberal view as to the beginning of interstate
commerce involved state regulations and most of the cases tak-
ing a conservative view as to the beginning of interstate com-
merce involved federal regulations. This at least arouses the
suspicion that the dominant majority in the Supreme Court in
these various earlier decisions was more concerned with the
protection of business against any social control whatever than
with making a correct decision as to where the line should be
drawn between intra and interstate commerce. The most recent
decisions seem to apply to federal legislation the principles
developed with reference to state regulations and to go back
to the general attitude of Chief Justice Marshall upon the
subject.
Second, of the cases which involve the ending of interstate
commerce. Chief Justice Marshall himself in the decision of
Brown v. Maryland35 tended to make more specific the general
rule which he had announced in Gibbons v. Ogden. In Brown v.
Maryland he held that foreign commerce was not over so long as
goods imported were in the original package and there was no
sale thereof. The Supreme Court in 1900 extended the original
package doctrine to interstate commerce. 36 The Supreme Court
has held that where goods are sold to be assembled as dis-
tinguished from installed, interstate commerce is not over until
the goods have been so assembled,3T and that where gas and
electricity are transmitted from one state to another, interstate
-300 U. S. 1 (1937).
"59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939).
12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
Austin v. Tennesse, 179 U. S. 343 (1900).
,7 York Manufacturing Co. v. Collery, 247 U. S. 21 (1918).
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commerce is not over until the pressure or voltage is stepped
down in the station in the community served.3 8  So where goods
are ordered by a buyer through a dealer in his state from a
manufacturer in another state, interstate commerce is not over
upon delivery of the goods to the dealer, and the dealer is an
agent engaged in interstate commerce;39 but interstate com-
merce is over and a dealer is engaged in intrastate commerce
where he sells goods from another state after an order therefor
by himself and the breaking of the original package,40 and a
peddler peddling goods which he himself brings in from another
state is not engaged in interstate commerce though there is no
breaking of the original package. 11
c. The Powers of the National and State Governments over
Interstate Commerce
The power to regulate interstate commerce is a specific
police power delegated to the federal government, but both
the federal government and the states have police powers there-
over, and not only that but both may have tax powers and
powers of eminent domain with reference thereto also. Gib-
bons v. Ogden is silent as to tax and eminent domain questions.
Both the federal government and the states have a general
power of taxation. Hence it must be assumed that the federal
government has the power to tax interstate commerce. Perhaps
if the federal government did not have this general taxing
power the grant of the power to regulate might be held to include
the power to tax. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
may levy duties on foreign imports in the exercise of its powers
to regulate foreign commerce, 42 and it naturally follows that it
might do the same in the exercise of its power over interstate
commerce. The federal government's power to take property by
eminent domain is an implied power which may be used in the
aid of other powers and it would therefore seem to follow that
U Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro, etc.,
Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of
Ohio, 283 U. S. 465 (1931).
'Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 (1905).
"Banker Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 222 U. S.
210 (1911).
,"Wagner, etc. v. City of Covington, 251 U. S. 95 (1919).
"Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States,
289 U. S. 48 (1933).
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the federal government may exercise the power of eminent
domain in aid of interstate commerce.4 3
The states probably cannot exercise the power of eminent
domain for the benefit of interstate commerce unless possibly as
an incident to their concurrent power. The states' power to
tax interstate commerce is another matter. Of course there
is no direct prohibition of state taxation of interstate commerce
but after a period of doubt4 4 the Supreme Court finally held
in 1888 in the case of Leloup v. Mob'le45 that there was such
a conflict between the states' power of taxation of interstate
commerce and the federal government's police power over it
that the latter would supplant the former, and held that a
state could not directly tax interstate commerce. Consequently,
the Supreme Court has held that a state may not tax persons
while carried in interstate commerce,4 6 nor goods while in
transit in interstate commerce, 47 nor the privilege of doing
interstate commerce. 48 Yet it has more and more been holding
that the states may exercise their general power of taxation
if it only incidently effects interstate commerce, and that they
may do this either by property taxes or by excise taxes. Thus
a state may tax goods being carried in interstate commerce
before transportation has begun,40 or while they are at rest in
transit,50 and after they have come to rest inside the state,
although because of the original package doctrine interstate
commerce is not as yet over.51 A state may also levy non-dis-
criminatory property taxes on the property of anyone engaged in
interstate commerce if the property is within its jurisdiction
whether land52 or tangible chattels 58  or intangible chat-
tels.54 A state may not only levy license taxes for the privilege
of doing intrastate business but a franchise tax for the privilege
of a corporate charter to do interstate business, 55 a use tax for
'United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 (1903).
"Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479 (U. S. 1873).
127 U. S. 640 (1887).
Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259 (1875).
" 'Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1 (1903).
"Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925).
Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886).
"Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933).
uBrown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885).
Glouster Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885).
"Glouster Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885).
5'Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15 (1934).
"Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456 (U. S. 1874).
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the use of articles bought from another state,56 a highway tax
for the use of the state's highways by interstate carriers57 and
net income taxes on income derived from interstate commerce
by a domestic corporation.5 s However, the Supreme Court
has held that a gross income tax has too direct an effect on
interstate commerce.5 9
(1) State Police Power
So far as police powers are concerned, it might be assumed
that the grant of a specific police power to regulate interstate
commerce would give the federal government an exclusive police
power and take from the states any power which they might
otherwise have had. This apparently was the viewpoint of
Chief Justice Marshall in regard to the matter in his opinion
in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden,. Perhaps he was influenced to
take this position by the logic of Daniel Webster. At all
events, when there came before him five years later the case of
Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 6o he definitely took
the position that the grant to the federal government of the
power to regulate interstate commerce did not take a concur-
rent power thereover from the states, and apparently he did
not even apply the doctrine of Federal supersedure because
there was a Federal coasting license involved in the case of
Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., the same as in
the case of Gibbons v. Ogden. It has been suggested that the
distinction between the two cases is the distinction between
small streams and large streams, but a better explanation would
probably be that Daniel Webster was not an attorney in this
case. The case of Wilson v. The Black Bird Marsh Co. was
followed by the License Cases."'
In 1851 a great change was made in the law of concurrent
powers which had been established by Chief Justice Marshall,
and his exclusive power theory was adopted. In this year in
the case of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens62 the Supreme
"Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937).
"Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commis-
sion, 295 U. S. 285 (1935).
" United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918).
"J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
02 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829).
615 How. 504 (U. S. 1847).6312 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
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Court definitely held that while there might still be a few mat-
ters like pilotage over which the police powers of the states and
federal government might be concurrent yet where a matter
was national in scope and needed one uniform method of regu-
lation the federal government's police power was an exclusive
power. This continued to be the position of the Supreme Court
until 1894. In this period came the decision that the regula-
tion of the rates of interstate railways was national in scope and
that therefore the states had no power thereover even in the
case of silence on the part of Congress with reference to the
matter.63 In this period also the Supreme Court held in its
celebrated liquor decisions64 that the states could not even
exercise their general police power indirectly to regulate inter-
state commerce. This period marked the passing of the
states' power over interstate commerce. It came as the result
of the nationalization of United States' business and a change
in the viewpoint of the Supreme Court as to the balance between
state and federal power. As a consequence of the decision in
Wabash v. Illinois, Congress was forced to pass the act creating
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In 1894 in the case of Plumley v. Ilassachusetts5 the
Supreme Court finally and definitely made another change in
the constitutional powers of the state and of the federal gov-
ernment over interstate commerce. This decision did not change
the concurrent power of the states and the nation in the small
territory where this obtained nor the exclusive police power
of the federal government where the matter was national in
scope and needed one uniform method of regulation, but it held
that where this exclusive police power of the federal government
came into conflict with the general police power of the states
for the protection of the general social interests of the state,
the states might exercise their general police power even though
they thereby indirectly and incidently regulated interstate com-
merce, provided Congress had not as yet passed any legislation
which would supersede such state legislation. This position
also was in accord with Marshall's logic in Gibbons v. Ogden.
It will be observed that this decision was directly contra to the
13Wabash, etc., Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886).
6 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890); Bowman v. Chicago N. W.
R. R., 125 U. S. 465 (1888).
155 U. S. 461 (1894).
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liquor decisions rendered between 1851 and 1894, but obtained
the same result as the decision in the License Cases in the period
prior to 1851, although upon a new and entirely different
ground. The rule of Phunley v. Massachusetts has continued to
be the rule up to the present time.66 It should also be noted
that in the latter part of the period between 1851 and 1894
the Supreme Court held that Congress in the Wilson Act could
give the dry states power to control the liquor traffic after
transit was over although interstate commerce was not over,67
and it has been contended that this meant that the federal gov-
ernment might delegate some of its own exclusive power to the
states or change its exclusive power to a concurrent power. But
the real explanation is that the Supreme Court was allowing
the states to exercise their general police power though they
thereby indirectly regulated interstate commerce after an act
of Congress permitting it. And this in a way anticipated the
decision in the case of Plunzley v. Massachusetts which held
that the states might exercise such a power without an act of
Congress. Now undoubtedly the Supreme Court would hold
that it would be unconstittional for Congress to change the
nature of our dual form of government.
What can the states do in the exercise of their general police
power, though they indirectly and incidently regulate interstate
commerce, provided they do not try to override Federal legisla-
tion? Here also Marshall saw the answer but later decisions
established the law. For one thing the states may exclude
articles,os or persons 69 if necessary to protect the health of the
people in their own state, and they may do this even though
Congress also prohibits the shipment of the proscribed articles.70
Although, of course, if Congress permits such shipment, a state
cannot forbid it.7 They may require of motor carriers liability
insurance as to third persons though not as to cargo,7 2 indemnity
bonds for injuries other than to passengers,73 the building by
61 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925); Kelly v. Washington,
302 U. S. 1 (1937).
07In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891).
OPlumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894).
I Compagnie v. St. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380 (1902).
70 Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189 (1904).
1 Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S.
87 (1926).
Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924).
Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 (1928).
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railroads of underground or overhead passes for the safety of
the public, 74 and may regulate the manner trains may approach
dangerous street crossings for the safety of the general public.75
States also may inspect either goods shipped in interstate com-
merce76 or property to be used by a carrier in interstate com-
merce, 77 but there can be no inspection of persons.78 The power
of a state to forbid the shipment out of the state of goods of the
state is perhaps not as great as its power to exclude goods. A
state may forbid such shipment of game and fish7 9 and running
water80 on the theory that the state is the owner thereof as a
representative of all its people in common, and in the exercise
of its general police power a state may conserve its natural
resources to prevent waste before they become articles of com-
merce.81  But after game, fish, or running water have been
appropriated by a particular individual so as to become articles
of commerce and in the case of percolating water, gas, oil, and
all other objects of individual ownership, the state cannot forbid
the shipment because they are articles of interstate commerce
and this would be too direct a regulation thereof.8 2 However,
in the case of Clason v. Indiana,8 3 the Supreme Court allowed
the state of Indiana to forbid the shipment out of the state in
interstate commerce of dead animals, although it permitted
such shipment in intrastate commerce, because the purpose of
the law was the protection of health through disposal plants.
Of course, one state cannot exercise its police power for the
benefit of another state. At first it would seem as though this
law in forbidding the shipment of dead animals in interstate
commerce out of the state was exercising a police power for
other states, but the Supreme Court thought the main purpose
of the law was to protect the health of the people of the state
of Indiana.
"' Erie R. R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Comr's., 254 U. S. 394
(1921).
Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U. S. 524 (1910).
Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38 (1882).
"Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S. 55 (1904).
" People v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59
(1882).
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896).
'Hudson County v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349 (1908).
"'Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8 (1931).
' Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923); Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928).
I59 Sup. Ct. 609 (1939).
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A state may not, unless it makes the use of its highways or
other property the basis thereof,8 4 impose any condition upon
a person engaged in interstate commerce for the privilege of
doing interstate commerce,8 5 and it cannot impose upon a
foreign corporation not engaged in interstate commerce for the
privilege of doing intrastate commerce any condition which
would violate any interest of the United States or of another
state under our dual form of governments 6 Instead of having
a power to impose a condition, the United States Constitution
imposes upon a state the duty to take jurisdiction of a suit
instituted by a person engaged in interstate commerce; s7 and
the Constitution permits a state court to take jurisdiction of
a suit by a non-resident against a corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce where a cause of action arises inside the state,Ss
whether the foreign corporation is operating in the state or not,
and of a suit by a resident of the state against a foreign corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce, whether the cause of action
arises outside the states" or inside the state,90 if the corporation
is operating in the state.' 1  But a state court may not take
jurisdiction over a suit by a non-resident against a foreign
corporation engaged in interstate commerce on a cause of action
outside the state,52 nor of a suit by a resident against a foreign
corporation engaged in interstate commerce on a cause of action
arising outside the state, if the corporation is not operating in
the state.0 3
Yet it should be remembered that whatever powers the
states may have are subject to the doctrine of federal supremacy
developed by Chief Justice Marshall in the cases of M'Cu och v.
Marylaizd94 and Veal.ie Bank v. Fenvo.95  In the application of
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
Furst v. Brewster, 282 U. S. 493 (1931).
SBarron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186 (1887); Hemphill v. Orloff,
277 U. S. 537 (1928); Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S.
440 (1931).
"' Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92 (1901).
International Iill. Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U. S. 511
(1934).
8, Denver, etc. v. Terte, 234 U. S. 284 (1932).
"MInternational ill. Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U. S. 511
(1934).
"Miissourl v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200 (1924).
"Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923).
"Denver, etc. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932).
"4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
"8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
K. L. J.-3
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this doctrine to interstate commerce the Supreme Court has
held that where the states and the federal government have a
concurrent power or where the federal government's power is
exclusive but the states have a general police power, the federal
government's power will supersede that of a state whenever there
is a conflict, and that there is such a conflict where there is a
disagreement between the state rule and the federal rule, or
where the rules are the same, or where the state's rule is less
or more than the federal.06
The most important change in the power of the states over
interstate commerce under our dual form of government since
the time of Chief Justice Marshall has been wrought not by
judicial decisions but by the Twenty-First Amendment to the
Constitution. Section 2 of this malodorous amendment provides:
"The transportation or importation into any state, territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited." This amendment did not give Congress the power
to prohibit such transportation or importation; Congress already
had this power.97 It gave the states, so far as concerned in-
toxicating liquors, through the weasel words "in violation of
the laws thereof" a power over interstate commerce which they
never had had before under the Constitution. After the adoption
of this amendment the Supreme Court held, as it was bound
to hold, in opinions written by Justice Brandeis that the
Twenty-First Amendment was not limited by the commerce
clause, the equality clause, or the due process clause of the
Constitution." The result was that the Twenty-First Amend-
ment pro tanto nullified not only the commerce clause but the
other clauses in the United States Constitution. A more
pernicious piece of legislation in the form of a constitutional
amendment could not be imagined. Because of this amendment
the states have begun to erect ports-of-entry and to levy all
sorts of taxation and tariff barriers against interstate commerce
in intoxicating liquors. This has made the situation between
"Erie R. Co. v. People of New York, 233 U. S. 671 (1914).
"Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311
(1917).
"State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59(1936); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938);
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Commission of Michigan, 59 Sup.
Ct. 254 (1939).
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the various states so far as concerns intoxicating liquors as bad
as the general commerce situation was at the time of the meeting
of the Constitutional Convention.
(2) Federal Government's Police Power over Interstate
Commerce
As we have already seen, Chief Justice Marshall held that
the federal government's power to regulate interstate com-
merce was a complete power which acknowledged no limitation,
which was as great over interstate commerce as it was over
foreign commerce, which included the power to prohibit, which
might be used for the general welfare as well as for commerce,
which limited the powers of the states over intrastate com-
merce, but was in no way limited by the reserve powers of the
states, and which apparently would also include the power to
prevent obstructions to interstate commerce and to foster inter-
state commerce. How have these various phases of federal
power fared throughout the years since John Marshall's time?
Of course the federal government's power varied from a
concurrent power prior to 1851 to an exclusive power -without
state general police power from 1851 to 1894 and to an exclusive
power subject to the states' general police power since 1894. But
while these changes in the law changed the police powers of the
states, they did not change the police power of the federal
government; because, if the federal government decided to
exercise its power, it made no difference whether its power was
exclusive or concurrent, for it could do under a concurrent
power what it could do under an exclusive power; and, because
of the doctrine of supersedure, its power would override not
only the concurrent power of the states, but any general police
power which the states might otherwise exercise.
The federal police power over interstate commerce has
manifested itself (1) in the regulation of persons and instru-
mentalities engaged in interstate commerce,9 9 (2) in the regu-
lation of goods carried in interstate commerce, 10 0 (3) in the
regulation of persons or things obstructing interstate com-
merce, 1'0 and (4) in the fostering and encouraging of interstate
"Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913).
210Bx parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877).
""'In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895); Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
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commerce. 10 2  Federal regulation has extended both to land
transportation and to water transportation. In 1887 Congress
passed the Interstate Commerce Act establishing an Interstate
Commerce Commission and giving it jurisdiction over the rail-
roads of the country and over the railroads and water carriers
in case of through carriage. Since that time the Commission
has been given jurisdiction over pipe line companies, express
companies, sleeping car companies, and companies transporting
intelligence by wire and wireless; and in recent times the
Shipping Board has been given power over water carriers on
the high seas and Great Lakes comparable with the power of
the Interstate Commerce Commission over the railroads. The
theory of these acts is to apply to some of our great monopolies
through administrative action the law of public utilities. Con-
gress has also passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Clayton
Act, and established the Federal Trade Commission, for the
purpose of enforcing competition, not only as to those companies
not regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but
even by those under the regulation of such Commission.
Chief Justice Marshall was of the opinion that the federal
power over interstate commerce was as great as its power over
foreign commerce. Dicta in many Supreme Court cases for
fifty years continued to announce this same position.'0 3  Madi-
son had given a slightly different opinion five years after the
decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, and Madison's distinction was
adopted by a dictum in Justice McLean's opinion in the slavery
case of Groves v. Slaughter.0 4 Justice White took up the torch
of this illumination in his opinions in the case of Buttfield v.
Stranahan'0 5 and the case of Abby Dodge v. United States.106
This position of Chief Justice White was subscribed to by the
court in Hammer v. Dagenhiart0 7 and was repeated by Chief
Justice Hughes in his opinion in University of Illinois v. United
States,'0 s so that now it may be assumed that the power of
Congress over foreign commerce is greater than its power over
'-c'Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456
(1924); Mulford v. Smith, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939).
'License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U. S. 1847); Crutcher v. Kentucky,
141 U. S. 47 (1891); Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577
(1894).
1015 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1841).
' 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
' 223 U. S. 166 (1912).
107247 U. S. 251 (1918).
289 U. S. 48 (1933).
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interstate commerce and that to this extent the pronouncements
of Chief Justice Marshall have been overruled.
While Marshall was not explicit upon the question of
whether Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce in-
cluded the power to prohibit the shipment of goods in inter-
state commerce, his general language is broad enough to include
this power. Webster and Iadison also took this position. The
idea that the power to regulate did not include the power to
prohibit was first invented in connection with the power of
Congress over foreign commerce. Jefferson's embargo was the
occasion for this discussion. In the case of Groves v. Slaughter'00
this argument was transferred from the field of foreign com-
meree to the field of interstate commerce, because of the fear
of the defenders of slavery that Congress might put a ban
upon interstate slave trade. Yet ignoring this argument, the
Supreme Court held in the beginning of the twentieth century
in one case after another that Congress has the power to
prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce."10  Yet
in spite of these cases the Supreme Court announced in the
case of Hammner v. Dagenlhart that the power to regulate did
not include the power to prohibit the shipment in interstate
commerce of goods manufactured by child labor. However, since
the first child labor decision, the Supreme Court has again held
that Congress may prohibit the shipment of prison made goods
in interstate commerce."' Hence it must now be assumed that
the position of the Supreme Court in the first child labor case
has been abandoned, that the earlier position has now been
reestablished, and that the federal government's power to regu-
late includes the power to prohibit.
It has been contended in recent times that even though
Congress has the power to prohibit the shipment of goods in
interstate commerce, it may do so only for the protection of
commerce and not for the protection of the general welfare.
I'l15 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1341).
",Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321 (1903) (lottery tickets), Hipolite
Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911) (impure food); Hoke v.
United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913) (white slaves); Clark Distilling
Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917) (intoxicating
liquor); United States v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423 (1899) (obscene litera-
ture); Rupert v. United States, 181 Fed. 87 (1910) (game unlawfully
killed); Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325 (1915) (prize fight films).
- Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central, 299 U. S. 334(1937). See also Mulford v. Smith, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939).
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The lottery case would seem to be one where Congress was
promoting the general welfare, but if this case did not so hold
certainly the white slave case so held. Yet this was the position
taken in the first child labor case of Hammer v. Dagenhart and
it was recognized again by Chief Justice Taft speaking for the
court in the second child labor case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co.112 Evidently the Supreme Court at this time thought Congress
would have power to keep child labor from harming commerce
among the states but not to prevent commerce among the
states from harming child labor. This issue divided the court
five to four in the railroad retirement and pension case.11 3 The
recent case of Nebbia v. New York 1 4 has apparently again re-
instated the proposition that Congress' power to regulate inter-
state commerce includes the power to promote the general wel-
fare as well as to benefit such commerce, and that the only
limitation on its power is that found in the due process
clause.
In Gibbons v. Ogden Chief Justice Marshall indicated that
the power of the federal government is not limited by any of the
reserve powers of the states, and in M'Oulloch v. Maryland"15
he established the doctrine of federal supremacy in case of a
conflict between federal and state powers. He held that the
federal government could tax state instrumentalities, but that
a state could not tax federal instrumentalities. 1 6 Later justices
of the Supreme Court followed this doctrine of Marshall's in
holding that the federal government might take the property
of a state by eminent domain though a state could not take the
property of the federal government, 117 in steadfastly holding,
as we have noted, that the federal police power of interstate
commerce would supplant the states' general taxing power over
interstate commerce, and likewise in holding that the federal
government could sue a state though a state could not sue the
federal government."18 Yet in spite of all this, from time to
22259 U. S. 20 (1922).
'Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railway Co., 295 U. S. 330
(1935).
="291 U. S. 502 (1934).
1s4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
'n'M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819); Veazle Bank
v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
'
7 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875).
2"United Sates v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621 (1892); Kansas v. United
States, 204 U. S. 331 (1907).
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time throughout our constitutional history, Marshall's position
has been attacked. His doctrine of tax supremacy was later
modified to give what may be called tax immunity equality. 119
More recently the doctrine has been modified to give reeiprocal
tax equality. 20 The second child labor case of Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co.1 2 1 held that the federal government could not
exercise a police power it did not have in the guise of taxation,
and the case of United States v. Butler.2 2 held that the federal
government could not use its general taxing power to cut
down the states' general police power, and for this reason
declared unconstitutional the first Federal Agriculture Adjust-
ment Act. Yet still more recently, the Court has held the
second Agricultural Adjustment Act constitutional on the
ground that it was an exercise of the federal government's
specific police power over interstate commerce and that this
would override the states' general police power.123 However,
the same position taken by the Supreme Court in the above tax
case was introduced off and on in certain police power cases.1 24
In other words, the court came to take the position that while
Congress' police power to regulate commerce among the states
is supreme over the states' power, it must not be construed
to include the power to conflict with state power, and among
the subjects segregated to the reserve power of the states and
which therefore lie outside the range of the power of Congress
was the power of production. This was the position taken by
the Sugar Trust case, and the first child labor case stood squarely
for the same position. The cases which recognized a current
or flow of interstate commerce of course indirectly overruled this
position. 12 5  The flow doctrine seems to have been abandoned
in the New Deal decisions of Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States'26 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 1 27 but this last position
"'Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937).
'259 U. S. 20 (1922).
3=297 U. S. 1 (1936).
Mulford v. Smith, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939).
The Mayor of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102 (U. S. 1837); United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (U. S. 1895); Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918)
2N Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905); Lemke v.
Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922); Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U. S. 495 (1922); Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923).
295 U. S. 495 (1935).
-298 U. S. 238 (1936).
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of the court has again been reversed and the current of com-
merce doctrine restored by the case of National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin C0.128
Hence it may now be taken for granted that the Supreme
Court has established that the Tenth Amendment is not a limita-
tion on either the express or the implied powers of the federal
government; that it reserves only the non-delegated powers;
and that it does segregate any state powers so that the delegated
powers of the federal government may not operate on them
under the doctrine of supremacy of the federal power;1
21
and therefore that any police power cases holding to the con-
trary have been overruled, and that any tax cases holding
to the contrary should be overruled.
The strongest illustration of the doctrine of federal
supremacy is found in the holding of the United States Supreme
Court that under its power to regulate interstate commerce
the federal government may also regulate intrastate commerce,
either when intrastate commerce and interstate commerce are
so interblended that one system of regulation is required for
both130 or to prevent obstruction and interference with inter-
state commerce.131
As a result of this short survey of important United States
Supreme Court decisions since the decision of Gibbons v. Ogden,
it must be concluded that the decision in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden is still very much alive, and that the work of Chief Justice
Marshall in his opinion in this celebrated decision still endures.
The definition of commerce is now the definition which Marshall
gave in Gibbons v. Ogden. The determination of the question of
when commerce becomes interstate has been worked out in detail
along the general lines laid down by him. The powers of the
federal government and their supremacy over the powers of the
governments of the states are today only an unfolding and
natural evolution from the principles set forth by the great
Chief Justice.
In conclusion, attention should be called to two recent
- 300 U. S. 1 (1937).
' National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920); United States
v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716 (1931).
l GHouston, etc. v. United States (Shreveport Case), 234 U. S. 342(1914).
'-National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.,
301 U. S. 1 (1938).
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addresses by prominent members of the legal profession. One
of these addresses was delivered by the Honorable Frank J.
Hogan as a presidential address to the American Bar Associa-
tion.' 32 The other was an address delivered by Honorable
Robert H. Jackson, then Solicitor-General of the United States,
before the section of Public Utility Law of the American Bar
Association. 133
Mr. Hogan was filled with alarm because of commerce
decisions and other decisions of the United States Supreme
Court rendered since Justice Robert's change of view in the
spring of 1937. He told of how again and again the Court
turned aside from what had long been looked on as "established
principles of constitutional law" "settled by repeated decisions
of this Court." The trouble with Mr. Hogan was that he ap-
parently was familiar only with the decisions of Justices Butler,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter, who dominated the
Supreme Court from about 1922 to 1936, and a few decisions of
such justices as Field, Fuller, and Peckham in the period
dominated by them from 1890 to 1910. The decisions of the
Supreme Court since 1937 certainly did reverse a lot of de-
cisions rendered by the men of whom mention has been made,
and if the decisions of these men were correct, perhaps there
was a cause for Mr. Hogan's alarm. But if Mr. Hogan had
read all of the decisions of the Supreme Court instead of those
to which he referred, he might have found more cause for
alarm in the decisions which were overruled than in the
decisions which did the overruling. The recent decisions in
which the opinions were written by Justices Stone, Cardozo,
Frankfurter, Reed, and Hughes may not be in accord with
prior decisions which were written by Justices Butler, Me-
Reynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter, but they are in
accord with those of Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes in the
period dominated by them from 1910 to 1933, with the decisions
made by Justices Taney, Miller, and Waite in the period
running from the time of the Civil War up to 1890, and even
with the majority opinions of Chief Justice Marshall. The
only opinions of Chief Justice Marshall rendering any comfort
for the Butler, McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Sutherland
-2 25 A. B. A. J. 629 (1939).
1- 25 A. B. A. J. 745 (1939).
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opinions involved are found in Marshall's dissenting opinion
in the case of Ogden v. Sandersl 34 and in some dicta in the
Dartmouth (Jollege Case.135 Long since many unsatisfactory
decisions of Justices Field, Fuller, and Peckham' 3 6 have been
overruled or abrogated by amendments to the United States
Constitution and later decisions of the Court without destroy-
ing our form of government in the United States. Why should
Mr. Hogan be alarmed with similar overrulings of the decisions
of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter?
These recent decisions have been no more startling than the
former. These recent decisions are in accord with the principles
announced in other periods by the greatest justices we have
had upon the Supreme Court. They probably have placed all
constitutional law upon a more rational basis and have made
it accord more with the needs of the people of the United
States. Yes, these recent decisions have changed our Constitu-
tion, but it was that part of our Constitution made by Justices
Butler, MeReynolds, Field, Fuller, and Peckham, not the
Constitution made by such justices as Holmes, Brandeis, Stone,
Cardozo, Taney, Waite, and Marshall. It would seem there-
fore that Mr. Hogan ought to have been able to have better
controlled his alarm.
Mr. Jackson in his address took a position practically as
indefensible as the position of Mr. Hogan, only it was
exactly the opposite of Mr. Hogan's. Mr. Jackson was not
filled with any alarm but was taking pride in the work of the
Supreme Court during the last three years; but he claimed that
the Supreme Court in these recent decisions had simply removed
the successive layers of oil which had been spread over the
original Constitution by prior justices and had revealed the
original Constitution as an old master, a genuine article,
welcomely restored. In other words, that the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court had only taken us back to the original
Constitution. This is as great an error as that of Mr.
Hogan. The Constitution to which these recent decisions have
taken us back was not a Constitution made in the Constitutional
- 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 827).
23 "4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
I" For example, Leisy v. HIardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890); Bowman
v. Chicago Northwestern R. Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888); Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895); and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U. S. 45 (1904).
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Convention, but a Constitution made by the justices of the
Supreme Court, mostly by Justice Marshall and his associates
prior to the Civil War, but partly by the justices immediately
after the Civil War and the justices between 1910 and 1922.
However, the fact that both Mr. Hogan and Mr. Jackson
were wrong in their rationalization of the work of the Supreme
Court does not detract from the value of. its work. The plain
fact of the matter is that justices with different viewpoints have
sat upon the Supreme Court throughout our history. Sometimes
the viewpoint of one group of justices, sometimes the viewpoint
of another group of justices has prevailed. On the whole in
the past decisions on our dual form of government which have
given the greatest promise of enduring are those which have
been rendered by Chief Justice Marshall and such justices as
Holmes, Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo. If this con-
tinues to be true in the future, it is a safe prophecy that the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court rather than the decisions
of that period immediately preceeding it will be those which
will endure.
